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Retail Pricing Behavior for Perishable Produce Products in the US 
with Implications for Farmer Welfare 
 





The typical model of retail pricing for produce products assumes retailers set price equal to the 
farm price plus a certain markup. However, observations from scanner data indicate a large 
degree of price dispersion in the grocery retailing market. In addition to markup pricing 
behavior, we document three alternative leading pricing patterns: fixed (constant) pricing, 
periodic sale, and high-low pricing. Retail price variations under these alternative pricing 
regimes in general have little correlation with the farm price.  
 
How do retailers’ alternative pricing behaviors affect farmers’ welfare? Using markup pricing 
as the baseline case, we parameterize the model to reflect a prototypical fresh produce market 
and carry out a series of simulations under different pricing regimes. Our study shows that if 
harvest cost is sufficiently low, retail prices adjusting only partially, or not at all, to supply 
shocks tends to diminish farm income and exacerbate farm price volatility relative to the 
baseline case. However, we also find that if harvest cost is sufficiently large and the harvest-cost 
constraint places a lower bound on the farm price, increased farm price volatility induced by 
retailers’ alternative pricing strategies may result in higher farm income, compared to markup 
pricing. Our study is the first to evaluate the welfare implications for producers of the diversified 
pricing strategies that retailers utilize in practice and the resulting attenuation of the 




I.  Introduction  
 
 
The typical model of retail pricing for produce products assumes retailers set price equal to the 
farm price plus a certain markup (George and King, 1971; Gardner, 1975; Heien, 1980; 
Wohlgenant and Mullen, 1983; Elitzak, 1996; Wohlgenant, 2001). If markup-pricing behavior 
holds in the grocery retail sector, we can expect to observe similar retail price variations across 
chains for a given product sold in the same city, assuming the same supply shocks affect all 
competitors. However, observations from a scanner dataset that contains 2 years of weekly retail   2 
prices for 6 produce commodities sold at 15 retail chains in 6 major US cities (24,957 
observations in total), indicates a large degree of price dispersion in the grocery retailing market. 
Some stores rarely change the product price, some offer occasional sales, and still others change 
prices frequently. In addition to markup pricing behavior, we document three alternative leading 
pricing patterns observed in the data: fixed (constant) pricing, periodic sale, and high-low 
pricing. Retail price variations under these alternative pricing regimes in general have little 
correlation with the farm price. 
This finding is not consistent with the standard model of retail pricing of farm products, 
which predicts that retail prices reflect the underlying farm prices and respond to supply shocks 
efficiently; in practice retailers set prices based on diversified pricing strategies, and the retail 
price does not reflect developments in the upstream, farm market. 
How does this weakened correlation between retail price and farm price affect upstream 
farmers’ welfare? Almost no work to date has addressed this topic. The goal of this paper is to 
investigate the producer welfare consequences due to alternative pricing strategies employed by 
retailers, compared to welfare under the benchmark strategy of markup pricing, while holding 
other factors, such as retailers’ exercise of market power, constant. The results provide insight 
into how the loose connection between retail price and farm price affects farmer welfare. 
Our welfare analysis focuses on perishable produce products, such as fresh marketed 
lettuces and tomatoes. A unique feature of perishable products is that their short-run supply is 
perfectly inelastic over a range of prices. However, the marginal cost of harvesting establishes a 
lower bound on the farm price because no product will be harvested at prices below harvest costs 
(Sexton and Zhang 1996).   3 
To incorporate these market features for perishable produce products into our model, we 
specify the determinants of weekly farm price under two alternative regimes.  When the marginal 
harvest constraint does not bind, the short-run supply is fixed at the exogenous level of farm 
production, and farm price depends on the market clearing condition and arbitrage between 
alternative market outlets. When the marginal harvest cost constraint binds, the farm price equals 
the level of harvest cost. 
Using markup retail pricing regime as the baseline case, we parameterize the model to 
reflect a prototypical produce market and carry out a series of simulations under different retail 
pricing regimes to examine how retailers’ alternative pricing behaviors affect farmers’ welfare. 
We also simulate the welfare impact under an “aggregate price regime”, which accounts for the 
fact that the different pricing behaviors coexist simultaneously. In addition, through a set of 
sensitivity analyses, we examine the welfare impact over a range of choices for the key model 
parameters: unit harvest cost, farm demand price elasticity, and magnitude of supply shocks, 
which enable us to discern the robustness of our results and to broaden the application of the 
conclusions. 
Our study shows that if harvest cost is sufficiently low, retail prices adjusting only 
partially, or not at all, to supply shocks tends to diminish farm income relative to the baseline 
case. In addition, these alternative retail-pricing behaviors exacerbate farm price volatility 
compared to markup pricing, exposing farmers to greater income risk, which further reduces the 
welfare of risk-averse farmers. This result remains true under the aggregate price regime that 
accounts for the coexistence of different pricing strategies across chains. 
However, we also find that if harvest cost is sufficiently large and the harvest cost 
constraint binds frequently, increased farm price volatility induced by retailers’ alternative   4 
pricing strategies may result in higher farm income, compared to markup pricing. In essence, the 
harvest-cost constraint places a lower bound on the farm price, whereas there is no comparable 
upper bound, meaning that farmers benefit fully from volatility-induced price increases but are 
protected from the worst price decreases. Whether retailers’ alternative pricing strategies causes 
higher or lower total farmer welfare relative to the benchmark case depends on the values of 
three key model parameters: the level of unit harvest cost, farm supply volatility, and farm 
demand elasticity. 
This study is the first to evaluate the welfare implications for producers of the diversified 
pricing strategies that retailers utilize in practice and the resulting attenuation of the relationship 
between prices at retail and at the farm gate. Various studies have documented the rising 
consolidation of supermarkets in Latin America, Asia and Africa over the past years, mirroring 
what happened in the U.S. and more recently in Europe (Reardon, Timmer, Barrett, and 
Berdegue, 2003; Hu, Reardon, Rozelle, Timmer and Wang, 2004). To the extent that retail 
chains in developing countries set their prices similarly to what is observed in US retail markets, 
the welfare implications derived in this paper apply in those settings as well and contribute to the 
growing literature on the impacts of food retail consolidation in developing countries on the 
welfare of smallholder farmers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature on related 
topics. Section 3 describes the data used in this study and provides a brief review of our prior 
findings about pricing patterns. Section 4 sketches the models. Section 5 carries out welfare 
simulations under different retail pricing regime as well as the aggregate price regime. Section 6 
investigates how harvest cost establishes a lower bound on the farm price and affects the welfare   5 
implication. Section 7 provides sensitivity studies on harvest cost, farm supply variation and 
farm demand elasticity. Conclusions close the paper. 
 
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
There has been both conspicuous policy concern and economics research debate caused by the 
rising concentration and consolidation of sales among large supermarket chains in the United 
States. Two notable questions are: (1) whether retailers have oligopsony power over farmers 
(Cotterill, 1993; Cotterill and Harper, 1995; Connor, 1999; Cotterill, 1999; Kaufman et al. 2000; 
MacDonald, 2000; Wright, 2001); and (2) whether farmers experience welfare loss due to the 
structure changes and the practice of market power in the retail industry (Sexton, Zhang and 
Chalfant, 2003). The study of market power in the retail industry is difficult because the major 
market power indicator (the retail markup of a price over its marginal cost) can be affected by 
many reasons other than market power, especially for multi-product retailers who on average sell 
40,000 or more different products in U.S. supermarkets.  
Instead of trying to parameterize the structure change of retail industry, this paper focuses 
on the behavior change of grocery retailers under such transformed market structures. While 
avoiding the struggle to prove the existence of market power, our simulations provide insight 
into explaining how retailers’ alternative pricing behaviors affect farmers’ welfare differently, 
compared to the baseline markup pricing case. 
This  section  briefly  reviews  prior  research  on  three  areas:  (1)  marketing  margin  and 
markup pricing, (2) retail price dispersion, and (3) welfare implication to farmers induced by 
alternative retail pricing behavior other than markup pricing. In addition to provide background   6 
information on related studies, this review helps to explain why markup pricing is a logical 
choice  as  the  baseline  case  to  study  farmer  welfare  implication,  and  how  our  study  is 
distinguished from prior research.  
 
1. Marketing Margin and Markup Pricing 
Markup pricing is a basic assumption on retail pricing practice used widely to estimate marketing 
margins for food commodities. In such case, the retail price reflects supply shocks efficiently 
(Thomsen,  1951;  Buse  and  Brandow,  1960;  George  and  King,  1971;  Gardner,  1975;  Heien, 
1980; Fisher, 1981; Wohlgenant and Mullen, 1983; Elitzak, 1996; Wohlgenant, 2001).  
  The marketing margin, also known as the markup or the farm-to-retail price spread, is the 
difference between the farm value and retail price, which represents payments for all assembling, 
processing, transporting, and retailing charges added to farm products (Elitzak, 1996). Prices are 
determined at the retail level first by what consumers are willing and able to pay for what is 
marketed, and then farm prices are determined by subtracting all marketing costs from retail 
prices (Waugh, 1964).  
There are varieties of ways to characterize the marketing margin (Gardner, 1975; Fisher, 
1981; Wohlgenant, 2001). It can be measured as the difference between retail and farm value of 
the commodity, by the ratio of retail to farm price, by the farm value share of total retail value 
(“farmer’s share of the retail dollar”), or by the percentage marketing margin (i.e., marketing 
margin as a percentage of retail or farm price).  
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2. Retail Price Dispersion  
If all retailers adopt mark-up pricing strategy, people would naturally expect similar retail price 
variation across chains for a product sold in the same city, assuming same supply shocks present 
in that city. However, observations from scanner data indicate a large degree of price dispersion 
across chain stores for the same produce products sold at the same market, the prices of some 
commodities seem never to change, but others vary significantly across time.  
The large degree of price dispersion becomes a major characteristic of grocery retail 
pricing  in  recent  agricultural  economics  studies  (Sexton,  Zhang  and  Chalfant  (SZC),  2003; 
Hosken and Reiffen, 2004). SZC (2003) show that farm-retail price spreads computed at the 
level of the individual retail chain exhibit wide variability over time, differ widely across chains 
with respect to mean and variance, and exhibit little correlation across chains. Some studies 
suggest that retail price variations often reflect changes in retail margins, rather than changes in 
costs (Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel, 1984; Pesendorfer, 2002; MacDonald, 2000; Hosken and 
Reiffen, 2004).  
  Theories  provide  different  explanations  on  the  motivation  of  retail  price  movement. 
Varian  (1980)  believes  that  the  motivation  of  price  movement  is  retail  competition,  thus  a 
monopoly  would  not  change  price.  Conlisk,  Gerstner  and  Sobel  (1984)  argue  that  even  a 
monopoly will vary price to discriminate against different consumer groups. Banks and Moorthy 
(1999) and Pesendorfer (2002) combine both competition and discrimination to explain retail 
price variation, while Lal and Matutes (1994), Hosken and Reiffen (2001) and Braido (2006) 
focus on the multi-product characteristics of retailers to explain the interrelated price variation.
1 
                                                 
1 The last class of models, often referred as the “loss-leader” models in the literature, predicts 
that the multi-product retailers may set prices for some products below marginal costs in order to 
attract consumers from competing stores.   8 
 
3. Welfare Implication for Farmers  
No matter what motivations are behind the retail price variation, it is certain that the farm-sector 
income is affected by the loose connection between retail price and farm-level price for these 
products. However, few studies have investigated this welfare effect to farmers. Sexton, Zhang 
and Chalfant (2003) investigate the case in which some final sellers of a commodity adopt a 
fixed-price strategy, regardless of shifts in supply and/or aggregate demand. They point out that 
price must fluctuate more widely for all other sellers to make the market clear. As long as 
marginal revenue is a decreasing function of sales for all market outlets, fixed prices will be 
harmful to producer welfare. They predict retail prices that respond more quickly and fully to a 
farm price increase than to a farm price decrease are harmful to producer interests. Also retail 
prices  that  adjust  only  partially,  or  not  at  all,  to  shocks  in  the  farm  market  are  harmful  to 
producers. The presence of imperfect competition in any of the procurement markets does not 
alter the fundamental conclusion.  
The same logic applies also to situations where some sellers only partially transmit farm 
price changes. A recent study by Li, Sexton, and Xia (2006) focuses on the pricing strategies of 
holding  periodic  sales  irrespective  of  conditions  in  the  upstream  market.  By  comparing  two 
scenarios:  no-sale  (i.e.,  mark-up)  strategy  to  a  periodic  sale  strategy,  the  authors  show  that 
producer revenue with the sale strategy tends to decrease unless the total demand with the sales 
strategy is sufficiently larger than the total demand with the no-sale strategy. 
The above papers on farmers’ welfare study inspire the work in this paper. Our paper 
improves and extends earlier studies by setting up the arbitrage linking between the two market 
outlets, and including harvest cost into the model. Our findings differ from the earlier works in   9 
the  sense  that  although  heterogeneous  retail  pricing  behavior  tends  to  increase  farm  price 
volatility  and  reduce  farmers’  welfare,  the  existence  of  harvest  cost  may  indeed  alter  the 
undesired welfare impact.   
 
III. The Data and My Findings about Retail Pricing Patterns 
 
The main dataset used in this study is retailer scanner data on weekly retail prices, volume and 
dollar sales, provided by Information Resources Inc. (IRI), which covers 15 retail chains in 6 
major  U.S.  cities  from  January  1998  through  December  1999.  There  are  20  chain-location 
combinations with 24,957 observations in the full data sample. The market areas include Albany 
NY  (two  chains),  Atlanta  (three  chains),  Chicago  (three  chains),  Dallas  (five  chains),  Los 
Angeles (four chains), and Miami (three chains). These markets cover a substantial geographic 
cross-section  of  the  national  market.  Six  major  produce  products  are  included  in  the  study: 
apples,  grapes,  grapefruit,  iceberg  lettuce,  oranges,  and  tomatoes.  Each  of  these  products  is 
available in several different varieties. The IRI data are organized by either universal product 
classification (UPC) codes or price lookup codes (PLU) that specify the variety. Farm-level price 
data are also available from the USDA Federal-State Market News Service (F-SMNS).  
  When comparing retail prices across commodities, across locations and across chains, we 
find  differentiated  pricing  behavior  over  time  at  the  commodity,  location,  and  chain  levels. 
Comparing across commodities, some chains exhibit strong and uniform chain-level strategic 
pricing behavior at a given location across all commodities. Comparing across locations, a retail 
chain may exhibit different pricing patterns for different commodities across cities, even after 
controlling for the differences in the farm-level price.  Comparing across chains at the same 
location, where we can reasonably assume farm price for a given commodity to be identical, we   10 
still observe systematic differences for pricing behavior across chains. These trends indicate the 
existence of different pricing strategies adopted by different chains. 
  The four leading pricing patterns we documented are: 
a)  Mark-up pricing: Retailers who utilize mark-up pricing set the markup fixed or fixed 
proportional  to  the  acquisition  costs.  Retail  price  movement  efficiently  reflects  the 
changes of supply and price at the farm level.  
b)  Fixed pricing: The retail price is fixed at a certain level regardless the fluctuation of farm 
price. One widely adopted marketing practice, known as every day low price (EDLP), is 
an example of fixed pricing. Under EDLP prices are fixed for extended periods of time 
and the frequency of promotional sales or discounts is low. At least 3 chains, out of the 
15 chains included in our dataset, never changed their retail prices for iceberg lettuce and 
tomatoes during the 104 week periods.  
c)  Periodic sale:  The retail price stays at a certain level for extended periods, interrupted by 
temporary price discounts, after which the price returns to its original level. In this case, a 
single “regular” price or several mass point prices exist. The “weekly special” pricing 
practices seen in some retail market may exhibit the main characteristics of periodic sale. 
It is important to note that although retailers put some basket of products on sale every 
week, the choice of sale commodities can vary from week to week.  
d)  High-low pricing: Price fluctuates frequently among different high and low levels. The 
mean of the prices may be relatively higher than fixed price, but the actual price varies 
constantly.   
Fixed price normally has lower mean than other price categories. The difference between 
high-low pricing and mark-up pricing is that the price variation of the former shows no close   11 
correlation with the farm price variation, but the later does. The difference between high-low 
pricing and periodic sale is that the former has relatively more frequent price variation. 
These pricing strategies (except mark-up pricing) show that retailers fully or partially 
ignore supply shocks for that product. In some cases, the price falls below marginal cost. Yet 
considering modern groceries sell a vast number of different products, retailers may well be 
acting rationally in using these stylized retail price behaviors as marketing strategies to attract 
and retain customers, in order to maximize their total profit.  
Some of the commodities in our dataset, including fresh lettuce and tomatoes, are highly 
perishable and normally not storable. Other fruit commodities, including apples, oranges and 
grapes, can be stored for some time with proper refrigeration. In this paper, we focus on the 
farmers’ welfare study for perishable goods. To the extent that other fruit commodities share 
similar pricing patterns as the perishable commodities, the method and analysis applied in this 




Suppose that a common produce commodity (for example, the iceberg lettuce consumed in Los 
Angeles) is sold at either grocery retail markets or at other final markets, such as restaurants and 
cafeterias in hospitals, schools, or other institutions. Let market 1 denote the aggregate grocery 
retail market (the retail market), and market 2 denote the aggregate of all other markets (the food 
service sector). Figure 1 illustrates the basic setup for the two market outlets. The left quadrant 
depicts the retail market, where   denotes the retail demand from final consumers for the 
commodity, and   denotes the derived farm demand from grocery retailers under perfect   12 
competition in procurement. The right quadrant depicts the aggregate food service market, where 
 denotes the final demand for the commodity in food service market, and   denotes the 
derived farm demand of the food service sector under perfect competition in procurement. For 
ease of illustration,   and   are assumed to be identical on the graph, and the initial harvest 
level,  , is divided equally between the two markets (figure 1).   denotes the per unit harvest 
cost, which equals a constant, depending upon what the costs are. 
 
Suppose that constant returns to scale applies for the produce commodity in the transfer 
from the farm to both final markets, and constant costs occur during the shipping, handling, and 
selling of this commodity at each market.  The amount of the commodity sold to final consumers 
in each market is equal to the amount procured from farmers by each market. Given total harvest 
, final prices are given by   and   at the retail market and food service market, 
D1  D2 
H 
C 

















Figure 1:  Retail Demand (D1
R), Food Service Demand (D2
F ),  
and Farm Demands (D1 and D2)  
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respectively, and farm price is given by   under perfect competition. The initial farm 
income (farm revenue minuses the harvest cost) is given by the area AIBC.  
In a dynamic model setting, we assume that the farm supply of the produce commodity is 
exogenously determined in a closed economy, and there are random supply shocks over time due 
to unexpected factors, such as the weather. There is no storage for the perishable commodities, 
and the market will always clear between the retail market and the food service sector at the 
current period. In addition, suppose that there is no retail demand shift in the model.
2  
If both retail and food service markets operate competitively in selling and procuring the 
commodity, final sale prices at each market will equal the product cost plus the fixed markups. 
We  assume  that  the  food  service  sector  operates  competitively  in  selling  and  procuring  the 
commodity, in that it consistently applies the markup-pricing rule. Meanwhile, we assume that 
grocery retailers utilize different retail price behaviors.  
 
1.  Impact of retail pricing behavior on farmer welfare     
Let farmers’ welfare from this perishable product be represented by farmers’ expected utility, 
, which is a function of the farm income from this product,  . Farm income in our 
model is a random variable due to the presence of random farm supply shocks and the existence 
of alternative retail pricing behavior. If the farmer is risk neutral, his welfare depends only on the 
                                                 
2 In reality, there are expected demand shifts (such as holiday effects or demand responds to supply seasonality) and 
unexpected demand shifts (such as food safety issue or change of overall economy). Because supply should be 
conditioned to meet those expected demand shifts, it should be justified not to include both expected demand and 
supply shift in the model. One the other hand, the unexpected demand shocks had nothing to do with our proposed 
welfare study, so we do not want to complicate the model unnecessarily with unexpected demand shift.  
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expected farm income. If instead the farmer is risk-averse, then the expected utility of the farmer 
increases with his expected farm income and decreases with the riskiness of his farm income.
3  
If the retail market utilizes fixed pricing, periodic sale, or high-low pricing in practice, 
the retail price to a large extent no longer responds to farm level supply shocks and the farm 
price, and thus the derived farm demand for retailers no longer exists. The quantity retailers buy 
from farmers is determined by retail price and the demand from final consumers. The farm price 
paid by retailers is forced through arbitrage to equal the farm price paid by the food service 
sector. If harvest cost is relatively small, the expected farm income under these alternative retail 
pricing behaviors in general will be less and the variation of the farm income will be higher, 
compared to those wherein retailers utilize the markup-pricing rule. 
Taking fixed retail pricing as an example, we see that at times of positive supply shocks, 
fixed retail pricing behavior results in farmers’ income loss. Likewise, during times of negative 
supply  shocks,  fixed  retail  pricing  results  in  farmers’  income  gain.  The  losses  in  general 
outweigh the gains, as long as the random supply shocks have zero mean, and the demands are 
decreasing functions of sales for all market outlets. Meanwhile, farmers’ income variation under 
fixed retail pricing is higher than that under markup pricing case. Figures 2, 3 and 4 lead us 
through the graphical analysis on how retailers’ fixed retail pricing behavior may induce farmer 
welfare loss. 
Suppose at time 1, production increases from the mean harvest level ( ) to  , 
where    denotes  a  small  positive  constant,  while  demand  remains  unchanged.  Figure  2 
                                                 
3 It has been proved in the literature that the expected utility function, , for a risk averse agent facing 
random income, gives rise to a mean variance expected utility function (Sinn, 1983; Mayer, 1987; Eichner, 2004). 
For example, the maximization of expected utility for a farmer who has an negative exponential utility function and 
faces normally distributed farm income is equivalent to the maximization of a mean-variance function of the form: 
   15 
illustrates a market setting in which the farm income decreases under increased production, as 
the retailers’ fixed retail price causes the additional volume to be sold through the food-service 
sector. Suppose that each of the two markets allows the downstream price to change in response 
to the increase in production, then each sells , and the farm price falls to  . 
Farm  income  from  both  markets  changes  from  the  initial  level A IBC  to  the  area  MKUP. 
However, if retailers adopt fixed pricing strategy despite the farm supply shock, then the retail 
price remains the same as  , and sales at retail market remain at  . In order for the 
market to clear, the food service sector now sells  , with the farm price in the food 
service market falling to  . Due to the arbitrage condition, the farm price paid by retailers 
equals the farm price paid by the food service sector, that is  . The farm income from 
both markets changes from the area AIBC to the area FIXD. It is shown from the graph that 
FIXD< MKUP. Figure 2 indicates that, with positive supply shock, the total farm income under 
retailers’ fixed retail pricing strategy is less than the total farm income under the markup retail 
pricing strategy. The farm income loss due to retailers’ fixed pricing behavior is marked as the 
shaded area in figure 2.    16 
 
Suppose at time 2, farm production decreases to  . Figure 3 illustrates a market 
setting wherein the farm income from decreased production is greater when retailers fix retail 
price, causing the farm price to increase to accommodate the decreased farm supply in food 
service sector.  
B 
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Figure 2:  Implication of Fixed Retail Pricing on Farmer Welfare  
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If both markets allow their prices to change in response to the increase in production, 
each sells  and farm price in each market increases to  . Total farm income 
changes  from  the  area  AIBC  to  the  area  MKUP.    If  instead,  retailers  keep  price  fixed  at 
, then retail sales remain at  . The food service sector now sells  , 
which is less than the quantity sold under the case in which grocery retailers allow the retail price 
to change according to the market conditions. The farm price paid by the food service sector is 
higher in responding to decreased sales in the food service market. And due to the arbitrage 
between the two markets, the farm price paid by the grocery retailer equals the farm price paid 
by the food service sectors, shown as   on the graph. As a result, with the negative 
supply shock, the total farm income under the case when retailers adopt fixed retail pricing 
0.5Q0 
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Figure 3:  Implication of Fixed Retail Pricing on Farmer Welfare 
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strategy is greater than the total farm income under the case when both retailers and food service 
sector adopt markup price. The farm income gain is marked as the shaded area with the vertical 
lines. 
 
Figure 4 combines the potential farm income loss and gain due to retailers’ fixed pricing 
behavior.  Graphically,  the  upward  diagonal  line  shaded  area  is  larger  than  the  vertical  line 
shaded  area,  which  indicates  that  the  income  loss  incurred  from  a  positive  supply  shock 
outweighs the gain incurred from a negative supply shock, assuming the average production 
change is zero. 
In addition to the potential farm income loss, the above graphical comparison reveals that 
retailers’  fixed  retail  pricing  strategy  tends  to  increase  the  volatility  of  the  farm  price, 
compared to the baseline mark-up pricing case. Increased farm price volatility is associated 
0.5Q0 
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with increased farm income risk which further deteriorates the expected utility for risk-averse 
farmers. 
 
2.  Estimation of the impact of alternative retail pricing behavior on farmer welfare     
How important are different retail pricing strategies in affecting farmer welfare for a produce 
commodity? In this subsection, we conduct analytical estimations to explore the direction and 
magnitude of these impacts.  
  Suppose  that  total  consumer  demand  for  the  farm  product  is  in  linear  form  as 
, and divided between retail market and the food service sector. Retailers set their 
price strategically and face retail demand from final consumers  
,  .  
Food service sector always allows prices to fluctuate accordingly to the market conditions, and 
faces final demand  .  
The parameter   measures the share of total farm demand by the retail market, whereas  ,   
and    are  cost  parameters,  such  that  .  The  inverse  retail  demand  is 
,  and  the  inverse  final  demand  by  the  food  service  sector  is 
. Under perfect competition,   and   are the per-unit costs for 
a commodity to travel from the farm to the retailers’ shelves or to the food service counter, i.e., 
the markups in each downstream market. 
If both markets allow prices to respond to supply changes efficiently, then the derived 
farm demand by retailers is  , and the derived farm demand by the food service   20 
sector is  . If only the food service sector allows price to fluctuate freely but 
the retail market does not, then the derived farm demand by retailers no longer exists, and the 
derived  farm  demand  by  the  food  service  sector  is  determined  by  residual  demand 
, in which case,  .  
The mean harvest  is normalized to be 1 without losing generality: . The 
farm supply shock at period  , denoted by  , is assumed to be normally distributed random 
variable with mean zero and variance  :  . The farm production at each period, 
denoted by  , is thus given by  . Similarly, farm prices at the mean harvest are 
normalized to be  . The absolute value of the farm price elasticity of total demand 
evaluated at the mean harvest level  is  , which 
is the normalized equilibrium elasticity. The relationship among the demand parameters is then 
given by   and  . Given this relationship, the derived demand by food service sector 
is  . At the mean harvest level, the proportion of farm supply goes into 
retail market is  , and the proportion of farm supply goes into the food service sector is 
.  
Let   denote farm income at time  , which equals the total farm revenue from both the 
retail  market  and  the  food  service  sector  minus  harvest  costs:  , 
, where   is the per-unit harvest cost. The yearly farm income is then given by 
. Let   denote farm income under the baseline mark-up pricing case,  ,  , and   21 
  denote  farm  income  under  fixed  pricing,  periodic  sale,  and  high-low  pricing  cases, 
respectively.  
In order to incorporate the expected income and the income risk faced by farmers, we use 
two measurement criteria,   and  , to compare farmers’ welfare under different 
retail pricing strategies.  
The total yearly farm income difference, denoted by  , equals the percentage 
difference of total yearly farm income between the alternative strategic retail pricing regime and 
the baseline case. For example, the total yearly farm income difference between high-low pricing 
regime and the baseline mark-up price case will be  , where 
and   represent the sum of weekly farm income for all 52 weeks under high-
low pricing regime and mark-up pricing regime, respectively.  
The  standard  deviation  of  farm  income  from  period  to  period,  denoted  by  , 
measures  the  weekly  farm  income  volatility  induced  by  alternative  retail  pricing  strategies, 
wheres  higher  standard  deviation  corresponds  to  higher  income  risk  to  farmers.  Both 
measurements  are  specified  in  percentage  terms.  If  we  further  specify  farmers’  welfare 
difference  between  alternative  retail  pricing  case  and  the  baseline  markup  pricing  case  as 
,  then  for  risk-averse  farmers,  is  a  function  that  is 
increasing in  , and decreasing in  .   22 
Suppose  with  random  farm  supply  shocks, ,  the  total  farm  supply  at  period  t  is 
. Under mark-up pricing case, denoted as case (a), wherein both retailers and 
the food service sector allow prices to vary freely according to supply shocks, we get the farm 
price by setting total farm supply equal to total derived farm demand, i.e. . Then 
the  farm  price  is  given  by  ,  and  the  farm  income  is 
 
,  
or  . 
Under the fixed pricing case, denoted as case (b), retailers keep the retail price fixed 
regardless of farm supply shocks, i.e.  . Because the retail price does not respond to 
the change in production, the retail market always sells . To clear the market, the 
food service sector now sells  . Given perfect competition in the food service 
sector, the farm price paid by the food service sector, , is determined by setting sales in the 
food service sector equal to its derived demand:  ,  
and  ,  or  . Due to 
the arbitrage condition that links the retail market and the food service sector, the farm price paid 
by retailers is the same as farm price paid by food service sector:  . Farm 
income under fixed retail pricing regime, denoted as , is given as 
.    23 
Thus, , or  .  
  The difference in farm income between the fixed retail pricing regime and the mark-up 
pricing regime at week   is: .  After 
simplification, we obtain . By rearranging the terms, we get 
, which contains the products of the inverse of the farm 
demand elasticity, the initial market share between grocery retail and the food service sector, and 
the first and second order of the farm supply shock. Holding everything else constant, the 
absolute difference in farm income between the fixed pricing case and the markup pricing case 
decreases in the initial equilibrium of the farm demand elasticity, increases in the relative market 
share between grocery retail and food service sector, and is larger when the supply shock is 
positive. 
  The percentage difference for the yearly farm income between the fixed retail pricing and 
the mark-up retail pricing regime is given by 
, the sign of 
which depends on the values of  ,  ,   and  . 
  If  , i.e., the per-unit harvest cost is negligible, then the yearly income difference for 
farmers  between  the  fixed  retail  pricing  and  mark-up  retail  pricing  regime   24 
is: . If the random farm supply shocks, , are sufficiently small, 
and   is large enough, such that ,  
the following outcomes are possible:   .  
The absolute value of a negative income change is larger in magnitude than the positive income 
change, because   is relatively smaller when  . Therefore, the mean farm income 
change is negative.  
We have shown that with linear demand functions, when the harvest cost in negligible and 
the farm supply variation is relatively small, fixed retail pricing behavior tends to reduce farm 
income,  compared  to  markup  pricing  behavior.  This  result  also  holds  for  nonlinear  demand 
function as long as the farm demand from the food service sector is downward sloping and 
differentiable at the initial equilibrium quantity. 
4 
 
3.  Harvest cost will affect farmer welfare implication     
What will happen to the above welfare comparison if the harvest cost cannot be ignored? For 
example,  based  upon  data  from  the  Cost  and  Return  Studies  by  University  of  California 
                                                 
4 Exceptions to this conclusion may occur when the exogeneity assumption for total farm supply fails to 
hold.  A typical example is that in times farmers may well elected to leave excess farm supply uncollected 
on the field in order to maintain farm price no less than marginal harvest cost. Detailed analysis on this 
issue can be found on next subsection at page 28 and 29. 
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Cooperative Extension, we estimate the harvest cost for California fresh-marketed iceberg lettuce 
is around 60% of the average gross return. 
5   
  The total farm supply,  , equals to the total farm production for most of the cases. Total 
farm  production  is  considered  exogenous  since  once  farmers  determine  the  total  acreage 
committed  to  a  product  at  the  beginning  of  a  crop  year,  its  production  variation  afterwards 
depends  mainly  upon  weather  shocks.  There  are  occasions  when  the  total  production  is 
sufficiently large that it drives the farm price to the level of the harvest cost. In these cases, the 
per-unit harvest cost places a lower bound on the farm price because farmers will leave crops in 
the field, unless price is at least sufficient to cover the costs of harvesting. In such cases, farmers’ 
harvest decisions endogenously determine the total farm supply and limit the possible income 
loss for farmers.  
 
                                                 
5 We calculate the average gross returns per acre of iceberg lettuce during year 1999 to year 
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Figure 5:  Marginal Harvest Cost Forms Lower Bound for Farm Price  
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Figure 5 illustrates the situation wherein the harvest-cost constraint for farm price binds. 
Suppose the total potential farm supply at time  ,  , is big enough such that, the 
farm price will drop below the harvest cost ( ), if all product is offered to the market. In order 
to maintain the farm price at least equal to the marginal harvest cost, only certain amount of 
product,  ,  will  be  harvested  and  supplied  to  the  market.  The  amount  of  excess 
supply, , is left in the field, and the farm price at time   is constrained to the harvest 
cost level: .  
Adoption of alternative retail pricing strategies tends to reduce farm income, whereas the 
existence of harvest cost, acting as a lower bound for farm price, tends to reduce the undesired 
part of the farm price volatility and prevent farmers from income loss.  The joint effect on farmer 
welfare, counterbalancing between retail price strategies and the form of farm price floor by 
harvest  cost,  depends  on  three  key  model  parameters:  farm  demand  elasticity,  farm  supply 
volatility, and the level of harvest cost.  
Analytical  solution  helps  to  clarify  this  intuition  and  verify  some  of  the  sign  of  the 
welfare  changes  under  simple  cases,  but  it  is  far  from  sufficient  in  examining  the  welfare 
implication under more complicated settings or addressing the magnitude of the welfare changes. 
Hence, simulations of retail pricing behavior and implication for farmer welfare are needed. 
 
V. Simulations of Retail Pricing Behavior and Implication for Farmer Welfare 
 
 
The first goal of these simulations is to evaluate farmers’ welfare effect induced by alternative 
retail pricing behaviors, compared to the baseline markup pricing behavior. The second goal is to 
determine  how  diversified  retail  pricing  behaviors  affects  farmers’  welfare.  Using  mark-up   27 
pricing as the baseline case, we carry out 10,000 simulations of welfare comparison under each 
alternative price regime, as well as the aggregate regime, which incorporates the coexistence of 
all four types of pricing behaviors. In order to isolate the welfare impact due to retailers’ pricing 
behavior, the simulations in this section were carried out with harvest cost set to be zero, and 
thus farm price is restricted to be non-negative. The simulation software used are Matlab and 
Crystal Ball. 
 
1.  Determinants of the parameter values 
Specifying plausible parameter values for  ,  , and   is the first step of the simulation. The 
quality of the parameter values, evaluated by how closely they reflect the real world practice, is 
crucial  to  determine  the  relevance  of  the  simulations  to  reality,  and  the  applicability  of  the 
conclusions in this paper for policy concerns.  
According to the data from USDA’s marketing bill, about 60% of the total consumer’s 
expenditure for domestically produced farm goods are made in retail stores, and 40% are made in 
the food service sector. Thus the initial market share of total farm supply of the retail market, , 
is determined to be 0.6. 
Farm supply shocks,  , are assumed to be normal random variables with mean zero and 
variance  :  . The variance of actual U.S. total shipment of fresh lettuce and 
tomato (including both domestic production and import) are applied to estimate the variation of 
supply shocks,  .
6 Since we normalize the mean farm supply to be 1, a reasonable setting for 
                                                 
6 The average variation of monthly total shipment of fresh lettuce and tomato are applied to estimate the 
variance of supply shocks. The use of monthly data, instead of weekly data (due to data availability), may 
result in underestimation of the supply variation. 
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 is to divide the actual farm supply by its mean, so that , and calculate the variance of 
supply based on the normalized farm supply:  . 
The own price elasticity of farm demand evaluated at mean harvest level is set to be 
 in the simulation model. SZC’s (2003) estimate of   for fresh lettuce is 0.433, using the 
same dataset as used in this study. In addition, the investigation of demand elasticity estimations 
from a broad range of literature for lettuce, tomatoes, apples, oranges sold in the US market 
further confirm the validity of our choice of elasticity above (USDA, ERS).
 7   
Table 1:  Initial Values of Parameters 
Parameters  Notation  Initial value   
Share of retail market    0.6   
Farm demand elasticity     0.4   
Supply shocks  Δ     
Farm value share    25%   
 
Farm value share, which is the percentage of the farm price to the retail price ( ), is 
set  to  be  25%  based  upon  USDA  data.
8    Since  the  farm  price  at  the  mean  harvest  level  is 
normalized  to  ,  the  equilibrium  retail  margin  under  perfect  competition  is  equal  to  3: 
. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the simulation. 
  
                                                 
7 Most of the reported demand elasticities for these commodities are inelastic, ranging from around 0.1 to 
0.9.  Notice  that  elasticity  estimates  from  literature  are  consumer  demand  elasticity,  instead  of  farm 
demand elasticity. Given the constant return to scale and fixed proportional farm value share assumptions, 
the  formula  to  convert  consumer  demand  elasticity  to  farm  demand  elasticity,  is:  , 
which indicates that the farm demand elasticity is in general lower than the consumer demand elasticity. 
 
8 The farm value share is derived from USDA data by averaging the mean farm value share for iceberg 
lettuce and fresh field-grown tomato (23%), and the mean farm value share of fresh vegetables (27%) 
produced in the U.S. during year 1998-1999.   29 
2.   Retail Pricing Behavior and Farmer Welfare Simulation 
This subsection reports Monte Carlo simulations for different retail pricing behaviors and their 
implications for farmers’ welfare. By closely relating parameters to the dataset, these simulation 
results show that, if retailers adjust price in a way that partially or fully ignore supply shocks, it 
in general hurts farmer welfare. At the aggregate level, when different retail pricing behaviors 
coexist, their impact on farmers’ welfare is also negative and significant. These results indicate 
that the loose connection between retail price and farm level price, and the diversified retail 
pricing behaviors, are harmful to producer interests, under zero harvest cost assumption.  
 
a)  Markup pricing (baseline case) 
Scenario (a) simulates the baseline case when all retailers adopt markup pricing strategy, and set 
retail price equal to the acquisition costs plus a constant unit cost of retailing:  .  In 
this case, random supply shocks are absorbed efficiently by both the retail and the food service 
markets.  Figure 6 shows the distributional results of farm income under mark-up pricing regime 
based on 10,000 simulations. The mean of the yearly farm income level is about 50.24, and 90% 
of the total farm income simulation results fall into the range between 48.01 and 52.38. Other 
statistics for the welfare results, including standard deviation, median, bands for 95% confidence 
interval can also be found in figure 6. The standard deviation of weekly farm income is 0.18. 
These  welfare  results  under  the  mark-up  pricing  case serve  as benchmarks  to  compare  how 
alternative retail pricing regimes affect farmers’ welfare differently.    30 
 
 




b)  Fixed retail pricing 
Scenario (b) represents the case when all retailers adopt fixed pricing strategy, while the food 
service sector uses competitive pricing. The fixed retail price equals the normalized equilibrium 
farm  price  under  mean  harvest  plus  a  fixed  retail  margin: .  Although  there  are 
random farm supply shocks from time to time, this retail price remains constant. Figure 7 shows 
the  simulated  total  farm  income  difference  between  fixed  retail  pricing  regime  and  baseline 
markup pricing regime. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant farm income loss due to 
retailers’ fixed pricing behavior, compared to the case under markup pricing behavior. The total 
farm income difference between fixed retail pricing regime and markup pricing regime, given by 
,  is  between  -10.88%  and  7.16%  within  90%  confidence 
interval,  with  the  mean  about  -1.63%  (figure  7).  These  simulation  results  show  that,  when   31 
random farm supply shocks are present, it is likely that retailers’ fixed retail price will reduce 
farm income.  
 
Figure 7:  Total Farm Income Difference under Fixed Pricing Regime 
 
Figure 8 shows the development of weekly farm income from one set of simulation under 
fixed  pricing  case, ,  and  under  markup  pricing  case,  .  The  farm  income  exhibits 
higher volatility if retailers adopt fixed retail price. Based on 10,000 simulations, the standard 
deviation of weekly farm income is 0.54 for fixed pricing regime, which is much higher than that 
under baseline mark-up pricing regime (0.18). These results indicate that retailer’s fixed pricing 
behavior not only tends to reduce total farm income in a given year, it also tends to induce higher 
farm income risk, both of which diminish the welfare for risk-averse farmers.   32 
 
Figure 8:  Weekly Farmer Welfare under Fixed pricing and Markup Pricing 
 
c)  Periodic sale 
 
Periodic sale represents the scenario when the retail price for a product stays at a certain level for 
extended periods, interrupted by a discount, then restores to the initial price level, and the cycle 
repeats throughout the year. In this case, in general a single “regular” price or several mass point 
prices exist. Figure 9 describes the simplified retail price movement under periodic sale regime, 
where  denotes the non-sale price in the retail market,   is the number of periods between 
sales,  is the price discount in sale period, and   is the sale price in the sale period.   33 
 
Assume that all retailers adopt periodic sale strategy, and they follow exactly the same 
pricing pattern for the commodity. To study the welfare effect between periodic sale strategy and 
baseline markup pricing strategy, a total quantity constraint is imposed to the model, which 
assumes that in a given year the total quantity sold in retail market under the periodic sale regime 
are the same as that under the mark-up pricing regime. This assumption helps isolate the retail 
price effect from the quantity effect. The null hypothesis for the simulation model is that holding 
market power (total retail sales) constant across the two alternative pricing regimes, retailers’ 
adoption  of  periodic  sale  pricing  behavior  will  hurt  farmers’  welfare,  compared  to  markup 
pricing. 
Following the same model setting specified in section four, the total quantity sold in the 
retail market in the baseline markup pricing case is  , and the total quantity sold 
in  the  retail  market  under  periodic  sale  strategy,  denoted  as  ,  is  calculated 
as
 
.  Under  the  total  quantity 
constraint, ,  the  non-sale  retail  price,  ,  is  solved  to  be: 
Week 
t  (() 
 
Price 
Figure 9:  Retail Price under Periodic Sale Regime 
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.  Under  the  normalization  condition  (i.e., , 
and  ), the non-sale retail price is:  .  
The simulation process includes five steps: First, we draw the random supply shocks for 
each of the 52 weeks, and compute  and  for each period under mark-up pricing regime to 
get the total retail demand for the whole year. Second, using the same draws of farm supply 
variation, for a set of  and  , we compute the non-sale price   and the sale price  , 
such that the total quantity sold at retail in the baseline case equals the quantity sold in the 
periodic sale case. Third, we plug the retail price into the final retail demand function to compute 
the quantity sold in the retail market at each period,  . Fourth, we solve the quantity demanded 
by the food service sector,  , and the farm price, . Finally, we compute and compare the total 
welfare differences for farmers under the two scenarios. 
Let us take the case where   and   as an example to present the detailed 
simulation results (Case 1 in Table 2).  In this case, retailers keep price at a non-sale price for 
three weeks, followed by a price cut that is about 10% off the non-sale price in the fourth week. 
The retail price moves back to the original price in the fifth week and stays for another three 
weeks, and then reduces by 10% again. This cycle repeats throughout the year, regardless the 
presence of random farm supply shocks.  
The distributional results from 10,000 simulations show that farmer’s yearly total income 
loss  is  around  -1.65%.  The  mean  standard  deviation  for  weekly  farm  income  derived  from 
simulations  is  0.55,  which  is  much  higher  than  the  mean  standard  deviation  under  markup 
pricing case (0.15).   35 
Table 2 summarizes the simulation results under different parameter values of   and  , 
some with longer price duration for the non-sale price within each price cycle (Case 2), and some 
have larger price cut in sales periods (Case 3). These results reveal that even if retailers acquire 
the same total amount of products from farmers as those under mark-up pricing regime in a given 
year, offering occasional sales leads to farm income loss. 
Meanwhile, we notice that if the retailer offers higher discount (e.g. 20% off the non-sale 
price), there is nearly no income difference between periodic sale regime and the markup-pricing 
regime.  How  could  steeper  sales  cause  less  impact  to  farm  income?  Although  seemingly 
contradicting  our  intuition,  this  result  reflects  the  joint  effect  to  farmers  induced  by  the 
alternative retail pricing behavior and the farm price floor constrained by the harvest cost. Recall 
that in this section, the harvest cost is assumed to be zero, and farm price is then constrained to 
be non-negative. In essence, the harvest-cost constraint places a lower bound on the farm price, 
whereas there is no comparable upper bound, meaning that farmers benefit fully from volatility-
induced price increases but are protected from the worst price decreases. Thus higher farm price 
volatility  caused  by  alternative  retail  pricing  behavior  may  not  be  bad  for  farmers  who  are 
protected by harvest-cost constraint. This finding becomes more obvious in the next section 
when the harvest cost is higher. 
Table 2:  Farmer Welfare Results under Periodic Sale Regime 
Parameters and results   Notation  Case 1   Case 2  Case 3   
Weeks between two sales    3  4  3   
Price discount (% off retail price)    10% off  10% off  20% off   
Mean total farm income difference, 
(Standard deviation in parentheses) 





(0.017)   
Standard deviation for weekly farm income  
  0.55  0.54  0.68     36 
 
The standard deviations of weekly farm income under periodic sale regime are much 
higher than that under markup pricing regime, which indicate higher risk to farmers. In addition, 
Table 2 shows that the variation of weekly farm income relates closely to the magnitude of 
discount offered by retailers. The larger the discount offered, the higher the variance in farm 
income.   
 
d)  High-low pricing 
 
Under high-low retail pricing practice, we observe more frequent price variation, and the price 
variations are mainly induced by retailer’s strategic choice of a pricing format, rather than by 
changes of the product cost. Thus the price fluctuation will be different than that under the 
markup pricing regime. In some cases when retail price rises under mark-up pricing regime, the 
retail price in high-low pricing regime may happen to undertake a price discount. Such counter 
directional price movements are often observed in the dataset.    37 
  Figure 10 illustrates a stylized retail price movement under high-low pricing regime. Let 
  denote  the  initial  retail  price,    and    represent  price  increase  and  price  discount 
respectively. The starting price at the first week equals . In the second week, the price goes up 
to its high price level, where  . In the third week, the retail price restores the mode 
price. Then it drops to its low price level in the fourth week, where  . In the fifth 
week price moves back to   and the above cycle repeats itself throughout the year. 
Intuitively, high-low retail pricing may be harmful to farmer welfare in the sense that if 
retailers ignore farm supply shocks when adjusting retail price, it may well induce severe farm 
price  variation.  Suppose  there  is  a  positive  supply  shock,  in  which  case  more  products  are 
available to the market. If both retailer and food service sector follow markup price setting, the 
price  at  each  market  will  drop,  and  the  quantities  consumed  by  each  market  will  increase. 
Instead, if retailers follow the high-low pricing pattern, they may happen to increase the retail 






Figure 10:  Retail Price Movement under High-low Pricing Regime 
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lowers retail sale, and consequently retailers buy less from farmers. As a result, food service 
sector will have to sell additional amount of product to clear the market. The farm price drops 
more than if retailers had adopted markup price strategy, and farmers experience welfare loss.  
Although in times of negative farm supply shocks, farmers benefit from higher farm price, the 
overall welfare effect may still be negative if the gains are outweighed by the losses.   
In order to compare the welfare difference under high-low pricing strategy and mark-up 
pricing strategy, a total quantity constraint is applied to the model, which assumes in a given year 
the total retail sale under high-low pricing regime is equal to the total retail sale under mark-up 
pricing regime. The null hypothesis for the simulation model is that holding total retail sale 
constant, retailer’s high-low pricing behavior will hurt farmer welfare. 
The total quantity sold in retail market in the baseline case, denoted as , is calculated 
as , and the total retail sale under high-low price strategy, denoted as , is 
calculated as . By setting , we get 
, so we can solve the retail mode price   such 
that  . Using the normalization condition and plugging 
in the equilibrium demand elasticity (i.e., , and  ), we obtain 
.  
Each simulation process contains five steps: First, we draw the randomly varied farm 
supply  shocks,  and  compute  and    to  get  the  yearly  total  retail  demand  under  mark-up   39 
pricing regime. Second, using the same draws of farm supply variation, we solve for retail prices 
under high-low pricing regime, such that the total quantity of retail sale under high-low pricing 
regime equals the total quantity of retail sale under the baseline regime. Third, we compute the 
retail quantity sold in every period under high-low pricing regime,  , and solve for the residual 
demand quantity and farm price in the food service sector,   and  . Finally, based on arbitrage 
condition that the price retailers pay to farmers equals the price paid by the food service sector, 
we calculate and compare the welfare differences for farmers between those under the high-low 
pricing regime and the mark-up pricing regime. 
There  are  two  possible  stylized  scenarios  under  high-low  pricing  regime.  One  is  the 
symmetric scenario, in which the price increase equals price cut and the timing of price changes 
is  symmetric.  The  other  refers  as  the  asymmetric  scenario,  where  either  the  timing  or  the 
magnitude of price changes, or both, is no longer symmetric. It is possible that both symmetric 
and asymmetric price movement exists under different circumstances. In this paper, we will use 
both case to carry out the simulation on welfare implication. 
 
Scenario (1) Symmetric price movement under high-low pricing regime, where price increase 
equals price cut (  ). 
In this scenario, we assume that the retail price follows a symmetric movement under high-low 
pricing strategy, where the magnitude of price increase and price cut are the same, and the 
periods between price increase and price cut are the same. For example, with  , the 
high price is about 10% higher than the low price, i.e.,  .   The simulation 
results show that the total yearly welfare between high-low pricing regime and the baseline 
regime is -1.77%. The standard deviation on weekly welfare is 0.54 (recall that the standard   40 
deviation  on  weekly  welfare  under  the  baseline  is  0.15).  The  negative  welfare  difference 
indicates that retailers’ high-low pricing behavior tends to reduce farm income, whereas the 
higher weekly welfare variation shows increased risk to farmers from week to week. 
Table  3  summarizes  welfare  results  under  different  choice  of  s.  According  to  the 
model,  larger    and    refer  to  bigger  price  increase  and  price  discount.  For  example, 
 corresponds to the high low price gap of 22%, while  corresponds to 
35% price difference between high and low price. We find that when the high-low retail price 
gap goes up to 22%, there is nearly no welfare loss to farmers (-0.2%). As the high-low price gap 
increases  to  35%,  the  simulation  shows  farmers  could  even  benefit  from  retailers’  high-low 
pricing behavior (2.81%).  These results again show that higher price volatility at the retail 
market may not always reduce expected farm income. The reason is that price is constrained to 
be nonnegative, ruling out the most severe price decreases, whereas there is no corresponding 
upper bound on price increases. 
Table 3:  Simulation Results on Farmer Welfare Difference for Symmetric Price 
Change under High-low Pricing Regime ( ) 
Parameters and results   Notation  Case 1   Case 2  Case 3   
Retail price change     0.2  0.4  0.6   
% difference between high and low price 
  10%   22%   35%    
Mean total welfare difference, 
(standard deviation in parentheses) 





(0.020)   
Standard deviation for weekly welfare  




For the standard deviation of weekly farm income, the higher the price gap, the higher 
farm  income  varies,  which  once  again  indicates  higher  retail  price  variation  associates  with 
higher farm income risk.   41 
 
Scenario (2) Asymmetric price movement under high-low pricing regime 
There are ongoing arguments on whether food retail price moves up and down symmetrically or 
asymmetrically. Some empirical paper declare there is no asymmetry found in the magnitude or 
frequency  of  price  increases,  relative  to  price  decreases  (Powers  and  Powers,  2001).  Other 
researchers believe that either the timing, or the magnitude of price changes, or both, is not 
symmetric in terms of the retail price adjustments for farm commodities (Kinnucan and Forker, 
1987; Zhang, Fletcher, and Carley, 1995; Azzam, 1999; Levy et, al, 2004). 
Prior literature offers different explanations on the source of price asymmetry. Kinnucan 
and Forker (1987), and Zhang, Fletcher, and Carley (1995) observe while wholesale price moves 
symmetrically retail price seems to have more price increase than price decrease, and argue that 
retail prices tend to respond more efficiently to price increase rather than price decrease. Azzam 
(1999)  uses  spatial  competition  and  monopolistic  price  adjustment  to  explain  anomaly  price 
adjustment. Instead, Levy et, al, (2004) argue that consumers have rational inattention, which 
means only price change above certain threshold will cause the change in consumer behavior, so 
it  will  be  profitable  for  retailers  to  strategically  undertake  more  price  increase  than  price 
decrease. 
The  observations  on  price  asymmetry  by  earlier  researchers  are  consistent  with  my 
understanding from the scanner dataset that there are more frequent price increases than price 
decreases. We also observe that the magnitude of price increase tends to be smaller than the price 
discount.  Figure  11  illustrates  hypothetic  price  asymmetry  movement  that  we  specified  to 
undertake the welfare simulation.  
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Assuming at time zero, the retail price is  . In the first week price increase to  , in 
the second week price goes up again to  , and the third week it continuously goes up 
to . In the following week, price drops to . This price pattern repeats through 
out the year. In the simulation, we set   and . 
According to the simulation results, the farm price and income difference tend to have 
larger variation, when retailer stick to high-low pricing regardless the presence of farm supply 
shocks. The total farm income is about 1.89% lower than that under markup pricing regime. The 
standard  deviation  for  weekly  farm  income  is  0.52,  higher  than  that  under  markup  pricing 
regime. These results indicate that asymmetric high-low pricing movement leads to negative 
impacts on farmers’ welfare. 
9 
 
3.  Farmers’ welfare effect under aggregate price regime  
Above  we  have  shown  that  these  alternative  retail  pricing  behaviors  (namely  fixed  pricing, 
periodic sale and high-low pricing), if adopted by all retailers, tends to reduce expected farmer 
                                                 
9 Welfare simulations are also done for other specifications of price asymmetry. The results do not change 
the above conclusion.  
PR 
Figure 11:  Asymmetric Price Movement 
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income while increasing the variation of farm income, compared to mark-up pricing behavior. 
Constrained by non-negative harvest cost, the expected income loss induced by alternative retail 
pricing behaviors becomes smaller as the retail pricing volatility increases, but the uncertainty of 
farm income increases.  
What  will  happen  to  farmers’  welfare  if  we  pool  different  retail  pricing  behaviors 
together? There are many examples in the dataset, which exhibit the coexistence of different 
pricing patterns across chains. For example, there are four different retail chains in our data sell 
the same kind of iceberg lettuce (PLU code 4061) in Dallas during year 1998 to 1999. The 
weekly scanner data indicate that the price variations at each chain store are very different from 
one another, which corresponds to at least three different pricing patterns. It is not clear whether 
the coexistence of these diversified prices will reinforce or offset one another, neither is it so 
intuitive as to conclude that at the aggregate level the loose connection of retail price to farm 
price will hurt farmer welfare.  
 
1)   How to get the aggregate price across different price behaviors 
To plausibly aggregate prices across different retail strategies, we need to find reliable answers 
to  some  key  questions:  How  many  retailers  are  adopting  each  of  these  different  pricing 
strategies? What amount of products does each type of retailers sell? Do retailers tend to offer 
sale at the same time or not? The answer to these questions lead to two decisions: one is to assign 
weight to each type of price strategies, and the other is to decide the timing for the aggregation 
across different retail price movements.  
For the weighting issue of the price aggregation, ideally, one should use the percentage 
quantity sold by each type of retailers as the weight assigned to each type of price strategies. The   44 
advantage of the dataset is that it provides information on volume and value sold at each store for 
each  product,  which  facilitates  in  estimating  the  weight  for  different  retail  strategies.  In  the 
simulations below, we generate some stylized weights assumptions that capture some of the most 
observed situations.  
For  the  timing  issue  of  the  price  aggregation,  there  are  evidences  in  the  literature 
supporting both synchronization (chains offer sales at the same time) and staggering (chains 
offer sales at different time) on cross-store retail price movements. Lach and Tsiddon (1996) 
claim  cross-store  staggering  and  within-store  synchronization  in  the  timing  of  price  changes 
using an Israeli dataset on processed meat and liquor products.  Ratfai (2003) uses food retail 
data from Hungary and finds synchronous price changes tend to be concentrated at certain time 
of the year, the third quarter, but not other times. The analysis in SZC (2003) tended to show 
correlations of retail prices almost at zero, suggesting there is no synchronization in the retail 
price adjustment across chains.  
Whether  synchronization  exists  or  not  across  the  retail-price  movements  affects  the 
aggregation  across  different  types  of  retail  prices,  especially  for  periodic  sale  and  high-low 
pricing practices. Recall that both periodic sale and high-low pricing practitioners offer retail sale 
at some point of time. Whether competing retailers tend to offer sale at the same time or not may 
lead to different aggregate welfare effect for farmers.  
From the dataset, we can observe examples of both synchronization and staggering price 
movements across chains. Instead of formally testing for synchronization or staggering across 
retail price adjustments, we carry out the welfare study using both possible situations. All other 
assumptions applied for individual pricing behaviors still hold in this aggregate price regime 
(refer to section 3 for details).   45 
 
2)  Welfare simulation for aggregate price regime 
 
i.   Trial one—equal weight for each type of retailer, while sales offered at the same period  
Suppose that retailers from each type have the same market share for a certain product, thus the 
weight equals 1/4 for markup pricing, fixed pricing, periodic sale, and high-low pricing retailer.  
Assume that the periodic sales retailer keeps price at its non-sale price for 4 weeks and then 
offers a 20% sale. Also assume that starting from the mode price, the high-low pricing retailer 
sets price at a mode plus 5% increase in week one, then increases it by 5% in week two. The 
price goes up again by 5% during week three, and followed by a 15% discount at the fourth 
week. This case corresponds to the situation when retailers offer retail sale at the same time. 
Table 3 shows the weights and the specification of price setup for each type of retailer. 
  Table 4:  Weights and Price Setup for Each Type of Retailers  




pricing  Fixed pricing  Periodic sale  High-low 
Weight  ¼  1/4  1/4  ¼ 
Price increase (k1)  ---  ---  0  5%,10%,15% 
Price cut (k2)  ---  ---  10%  15% 
   
According to the simulation, the mean total farm income difference under aggregate price 
regime is -2%, compared to mark-up pricing regime. The standard deviation of weekly farm 
income is 0.52, which is much higher than that under the markup-pricing regime (0.18). 
 
 
ii.   Trial two—different weights for each type of retailer, while sales offered at the same 
time period by retailers   46 
In this trial, different weights are assigned to each type of retailers based on samples from the 
data (Table 5). For example, there are 15 retail chains that sell red delicious apple, where six out 
of the 15 chains use fixed pricing strategy, five chains use periodic sale strategy, and the others 
use either high-low pricing or mark-up pricing strategy. Accordingly, we allow fixed pricing and 
periodic sale to have more weight than the other two pricing strategies.  
Table 5:  Weights and Price Setup for Each Type of Retailers  
under Aggregate Regime (Trial 2) 
 
   Markup pricing  Fixed pricing  Periodic sale  High-low 
Weight  1/6  1/3  1/3  1/6 
Price increase (k1)  ---  ---  0  5%,10%,15% 
Price cut (k2)  ---  ---  10%  15% 
 
 
The  simulation  results  reveal  that  the  total  farm  income  difference  is  about  -2.03%, 
compared to markup pricing case. The standard deviation of weekly farm income is 0.52. These 
results  are  similar  to  the  last  trial,  and  again  verify  there  is  farmer  welfare  loss  under  the 
diversified retail pricing behaviors. 
 
 
iii.  Trial three—same weight for each type of retailer, while sales offered at different period 
In this case, equal weight of 1/4 is assigned for each type of retailers. The sale prices are allowed 
to  happen  at  different  period.  This  corresponds  to  the  case  when  cross-store  retail  price 
movements are staggering. 
The simulation results show that the mean of the total farm income is around -1.91%. The 
standard  deviation  of  weekly  farm  income  is  still  about  0.52.  These  results  are  similar  to 
previous results in trial one and two, which shows the staggered price adjustment will not change 
their jointly negative effect to farmer welfare.    47 
 
VI. Harvest Cost Forms A Lower Bound for Farm Price 
 
In the last section, by setting harvest cost to be zero, we isolated the effect of retail pricing on 
farmers’ welfare and found that retail pricing strategies, if fully or partially ignoring farm supply 
shock, tend to reduce farmer welfare. In this section, we focus on the possible endogeniety of 
farm supply and show how harvest cost forms a lower bound constraint for farm price to change 
the welfare effect to farmers.  The aggregated price regime is used in carrying out the welfare 
simulation in compare to markup pricing regime. 
Harvest decision may endogenously determine farm supply because no crops will be 
harvested for a price below the marginal harvest cost. For lettuce, harvest cost includes the cost 
of cutting, packing, hauling, cooling and selling of the product. For tomatoes, it includes picking 
up, hauling to shed, packing and selling. The estimation of the harvest cost for fresh-marketed 
lettuce and tomato is around 60% of the farm price, based upon the Cost and Return Studies by 
University of California Cooperative Extension.   
If we include a normalized estimate of harvest cost that equals to 0.6 into the welfare 
simulation for aggregate pricing case, about 1/3 of the times during the 52 week periods the farm 
price will be determined by the harvest cost constraint (figure 12). This simulation result is 
consistent with Sexton and Zhang (1996), who found that the harvest-cost constraint set price 
about one third of the time for California iceberg lettuce.  The existence of harvest cost, acting as 
a lower bound for the farm price, restricts farmers’ welfare loss. The higher the harvest cost, the 
more likely the lower bound constraint for farm price binds.    48 
 
Figure 12:  Harvest Cost Serves as a Lower Bound for the Farm Price 
 
Figure 13 shows that the harvest cost positively correlates to the change of total farm 
income. Note that 0.05 on the vertical axis represents 5% total farm income difference, while 0.1 
on the horizontal axis represents a per-unit harvest that equal 10% of the initial equilibrium farm 
price.  Holding  the  demand  elasticity  and  farm  supply  shock  the  same  as  prior  levels,  when 
harvest cost is zero, there could be about 2% welfare loss induced by diversified retail pricing 
behaviors. The welfare loss becomes smaller as the harvest cost becomes larger. With harvest 
cost greater than 20% of the equilibrium farm price, we start to see positive change of total 
welfare, which indicate that the aggregated retail pricing strategies although inducing higher 
farm price variation, may indeed increase farmer welfare. Whether the joint welfare effect from 
increased expected farm income and increased income risk leads to higher or lower welfare to 
farmers depends largely on farmers’ risk attitude. 
   49 
 
Figure 13:  Harvest Cost Positively Correlates to the Change of Total Farm Income 
 
VII. Sensitivity Studies 
 
In this section, we carry out the sensitivity studies for harvest cost, farmer supply variation, and 
the demand elasticity, to see how the change of parameters changes the welfare comparison 
between the aggregate pricing regime and the baseline markup regime. These revisits of the 
choices of parameters enable us to discern the robustness of our results and to broaden the 
application of the conclusions.    50 
 
Figure 14:  Supply Variation in General Positively Correlates to Change of Total Welfare 
Figure 14 shows that in general the farm supply variation positively correlates to change 
of total farm income. Exception of this occurs at low supply shock level, where kinks present 
around .  In  this  figure,  the  farm  demand  elasticity  is  fixed  at  the  initial  choice 
( ), and the harvest cost are shown at different levels from 0 to 0.6, which corresponds to 
0% to 60% of the initial equilibrium farm price. 
There are different estimates of the demand elasticity for produce products in the U.S. 
The majority of these elasticity estimates for lettuces, tomato, apples and oranges are between 
0.1 and 0.9. For example, Huang’s (1993) elasticity estimates are -0.14 for lettuces, -0.56 for 
tomato, -0.20 for apples and -0.996 for oranges. Henneberry’s (1999) estimates are -0.23 for 
tomato, and -0.59 for apples.     51 
 
Figure 15:  Demand Elasticity Negatively Correlates to the Change of Total Welfare 
Figure 15 shows that the farm demand elasticity negatively correlates to the change of 
total welfare, when random farm supply shocks are still set to the initial level:  . 
The higher the demand elasticity, the less farm price responds to change of demand quantity, and 
the  less  farm  income  difference  induced  by  alternative  retail  pricing  behaviors.  When  the 
elasticity is relatively larger, say above 0.9, almost any level of harvest cost will not prevent 
welfare loss. When the elasticity is small, it is likely that farmers will benefit from higher farm 
price volatility induced by alternative retail pricing behaviors.     52 
 
Figure 16:  Welfare Implication under Different Values of   
Figure 16 shows farmer welfare implication under different values of harvest cost, farm 
supply variation and farm demand elasticity, which helps to shed light on how the simulated 
farm  income  difference  is  likely  to  be  under  different  combination  of  the  three  factors.  For 
example, the random supply shock derived from U.S. supply for apples is  , the 
mean absolute value of the estimated demand elasticity is  , and the harvest cost is 60% 
of the equilibrium farm price. As shown in plot #4 in figure 16, at the aggregate level, the 
diversified retail pricing behaviors increase expected farm income by about 6%, compared to 
markup pricing regime. 




Using  mark-up  pricing  as  a  baseline  case,  this  paper  simulates  how  different  retail  pricing 
behaviors affect farmers’ welfare. The study shows that if harvest cost is sufficiently low, retail 
prices adjusting only partially, or not at all, to supply shocks tends to diminish farm income 
relative to the baseline case. In addition, these alternative retail-pricing behaviors exacerbate 
farm price volatility compared to markup pricing, exposing farmers to greater income risk, which 
further reduces the welfare of risk-averse farmers. This result remains true under an aggregate 
price regime that accounts for the coexistence of different pricing strategies across chains. These 
results indicate that the price dispersion in the retail market and the loose connection between 
retail price and farm price can be harmful to producer interest under certain conditions.  
However, we also find that if sufficiently large harvest cost place a lower bound on the 
farm price, whereas there is no comparable upper bound, alternative retail pricing behavior may 
increase farm income, compared to the markup pricing case. This is because the farmers benefit 
fully from volatility-induced price increases but are protected from the worst price decreases. 
Meanwhile, increased farm price volatility induced by retailers’ alternative pricing strategies also 
increases farm income risk. The welfare for risk-averse farmers increases with the expected farm 
income and decreases with risk. The overall welfare effect to farmers induced by different retail 
pricing  behaviors  depends  on  the  level  of  the  harvest  cost,  the  farm  demand  elasticity,  the 
magnitude of farm supply shocks, and the specification of farmers’ risk attitude. 
  The  method  and  conclusions  in  this  paper  have  potential  policy  application  to  other 
countries, including less developed countries (LDCs). More than half the population engages in 
agricultural activities in LDCs, most of whom are among the poorest population, so farmers’   54 
welfare evaluation and improvement represent critical policy concerns for these countries. To the 
extend that retail chains in these countries set price in similar patterns to those observed in the 





Azzam.  A.  (1999).  Asymmetry  and  Rigidity  in  Farm-Retail  Price  Transmission,  American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81, 525–533. 
 
Banks,  J.  and  Moorthy,  S.  (1999).  A  Model  of  Price  Promotions  with  Consumer  Search, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17, 371–398. 
 
Braido, L. (2006). A Theory of Weekly Specials, Working Paper, Getulio Vargas Foundation 
(FGV) - Graduate School of Economics (EPGE). 
 
Buse, R. and Brandow, G. (1960). The Relationship of Volume, Prices and Costs to Marketing 
Margins for Farm Foods, Journal of Farm Economics, 42, 362–370. 
 
Chevalier, J., Kashyap, A., and Rossi, P. (2003). Why Don't Prices Rise During Periods of Peak 
Demand? Evidence from Scanner Data, American Economic Review, 93(1), 15–37. 
 
Conlisk, J., Gerstner, E., and Sobel, J. (1984). Cyclic Pricing by A Durable Goods Monopolist, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 489–505. 
 
Connor, J. (1999). Evolving Research on Price Competition in The Grocery Retailing Industry: 
An Appraisal, Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 28, 119–127. 
 
Cotterill,  R.  (1993).  Competitive  Strategy  Analysis  in  The  Food  System,  Westview  Press, 
Boulder, Co. 
 
Cotterill, R. (1999). Market Power and The Demsetz Quality Critique: An Evaluation for Food 
Marketing, Agribusiness, 15, 101–118. 
 
Cotterill, R. and Harper, C. (1995). Market Power and The Demsetz Quality Critique: An 
Evaluation  for  Food  Retailing.  Food  Marketing  Policy  Center,  Research  Report  No.  29, 
University Of Connecticut.   55 
 
Daniel, H., Matsa, D., and Reiffen, D. (2000). How Do Retailers Adjust Prices: Evidence from 
Store-level Data, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau Of Economics Working Paper 230.  
 
Eichner, T .  (2004).  A  Further  Remark  on  Two-moment  Decision  Models  and  Utility-
representable Preferences, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55, 435–436. 
 
Elitzak, H. (1996). Food Cost Review, Agricultural Economics Report No. 729, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Stanford, California.  
 
Fisher,  B.  (1981).  The  Impact  on  Changing  Marketing  Margins  on  Farm  Prices,  American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63, 261–263. 
 
Gardner, B. (1975). The Farm-retail Price Spread in A Competitive Food Industry, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57, 39–409. 
 
George,  P.,  and  King,  G.  (1971).  Consumer  Demand  for  Food  Commodities  in  The  United 
States, with Projections For 1980, Giannini Foundation Monograph No. 26. 
 
Heien, D. (1980). Markup Pricing in A Dynamic Model of The Food Industry, American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 62, 10–18. 
 
Henneberry, S., Piewthongngam, K., and Qiang, H.  (1999), Consumer Food Safety Concerns  
and Fresh Produce Consumption, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 24 (1), 98–
113. 
 
Hosken,  D.,  and  Reiffen,  D.  (2001).  Multiproduct  Retailers  and  The  Sale  Phenomenon, 
Agribusiness, 17, 115–137. 
 
Hosken,  D.,  and  Reiffen,  D.  (2004).  Patterns  of  Retail  Price  Variation,  Rand  Journal  of 
Economics, 35 (1), 128–146 
 
Hu,  D.,  Reardon,  T.,  Rozelle,  S.,  Timmer,  P.,  and  Wang.  H. ( 2004).  The  Emergence  of 
Supermarkets w ith  Chinese  Characteristics:  Challenges  and  Opportunities  for  China’s 
Agricultural Development, Development Policy Review, 22 (4), 557–586. 
 
Huang, K. (1993). A Complete System of U.S. Demand for Food, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Technical Bulletin No. 1821, September.  
   56 
Kaufman, P., Handy, C., Mclaughlin, E., Park, K., and Green, G. (2000). Understanding The 
Dynamics  of  Produce  Markets:  Consumption  and  Consolidation  Grow,  U.  S.  Department  of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, AIB–758. 
 
Kinnucan, H. and Forker O. (1987). Asymmetry in Farm-retail Price Transmission for Major 
Dairy Products, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69, 285-–92. 
 
Lach S, and Tsiddon D. (1996). Staggering and Synchronization in Price Setting: Evidence from 
Multiproduct Firms. American Economic Review, 86, 1175–96. 
 
Lal, R., and Matutes, C. (1994). Retail Pricing and Advertising Strategies, Journal of Business, 
67, 345–370. 
 
Levy, D., Bergen, M., Dutta, S., and Venable, R. (1997). The Magnitude of Menu Costs: Direct 
Evidence from Large U.S. Supermarket Chains, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 791–825. 
 
Levy, D., Chang, H., Ray, S. and Bergen, M. (2004). Asymmetric Price Adjustment in The 
Small:  An  Implication  of  Rational  Inattention,  Working  Papers  04–23,  Utrecht  School  of 
Economics. 
 
Li, L., Sexton, R. (2005). Retailer Pricing Strategies for Differentiated Products: The Case of 
Bagged  Salads  and  Lettuce,  Selected  Paper  Prepared  For  Presentation  at  The  American 
Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting 
 
Li, L., Sexton, R., and Xia, T. (2006). Food Retailers’ Pricing and Marketing Strategies, with 
Implications for Producers, Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 35(2), 1–18. 
 
Macdonald, J. (2000). Demand, Information, and Competition: Why Do Food Prices Fall at 
Seasonal Demand Peaks? Journal of Industrial Economics, 48 (1), 27–45. 
 
Meyer, J. (1987). Two-moment Decision Models and Expected Utility Maximization, American 
Economics Review, 77, 421–430. 
 
Nagle, T., and Holden, R. (1994). The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing: A Guide to Profitable 
Decision Making, 2nd Ed, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
 
Pesendorfer, M. (2002). Retail Sales: A Study of Pricing Behavior in Supermarkets. Journal of 
Business, 75, 33–66.  
   57 
Powers, E. and Powers, N. (2001). The Size and Frequency of Price Changes: Evidence from 
Grocery Stores, Review of Industrial Organization, 18, 397–416. 
 
Rátfai, A. (2006). Linking Individual and Aggregate Price Changes”, Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, December:  2199–2224 
 
Reardon, T., Timmer, C., Barrett, C., Berdegue, J. (2003). The Rise of Supermarkets in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85 (5), 1140–46. 
 
Sexton, R., and Zhang M. (1996). A Model of Price Determination for Fresh Produce with 
Application  to  California  Iceberg  Lettuce,  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics,  78, 
924–34. 
 
Sexton, R., Zhang, M., and Chalfant, J. (2003) Grocery Retailer Behavior in The Procurement 
and  Sale  of  Perishable  Fresh  Produce  Commodities,  Economic  Research  Service,  U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Contractors and Cooperators Report No. 2. 
 
Sinn, H-W. (1983). Economic Decisions under Uncertainty, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Sobel, J. (1984). The Timing of Sales, Review of Economic Studies, 51, 353–368.  
 
Thomsen, F. (1951). Agricultural Marketing, Mcgraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., Chicago.  
 
Varian, H. (1980). A Model of Sales, American Economic Review, 70, 651–659.  
 
Warner, E., and Barsky, R. (1995). The Timing and Magnitude of Retail Store Markdowns: 
Evidence from Weekends and Holidays. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 321–352.  
 
Waugh, F. (1964). Demand and Price Analysis, Technical Bulletin No. 1316, U.S. Department 
Of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
 
Wohlgenant,  M. a nd  Mullen,  J.  (1987).  Modeling  The  Farm-retail  Price  Spread  for  Beef, 
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 12, 119–125. 
 
Wohlgenant, M., and Michael, K. (2001). Marketing Margins: Empirical Analysis, Handbook of 
Agricultural Economics, Volume 1, Chapter 16, 933–970. 
 
Wright, J. (2001), Von’s Grocery and The Concentration-price Relationship in Grocery Retail, 
UCLA Law Review, 48, 743–779.   58 
 
Zhang, P., Fletcher, S., and Carley, D. (1995). Peanut Price Transmission Asymmetry in Peanut 
Butter, Agribusiness, 11, 13–20. 
 
 
 